Twelfth Distinction. Third Part: About Change in the Accidents

321. About the third main part [n.6] I ask first about possible change when the Eucharist persists, second about change wherewith the Eucharist does not persist.

First Article: About Possible Change of the Accidents while the Eucharist Remains

Question One. Whether Every Change that Could be Caused by a Created Agent in the Accidents in the Persisting Eucharist Necessarily Requires the Persistence of the Same Quantity

322. About the first question [n.321] I ask whether every change, capable of being caused by a created agent in the accidents in the Eucharist while the Eucharist persists, necessarily requires the persistence of the same quantity.

323. That it does:

Because both motion and change necessarily require a subject and presuppose it (the point is plain from the definition of motion, Physics 3.1.201a10-11, 27-29, that “motion is the act of a being in potency” and “is the act of the movable insofar as it is movable;” and Physics 5.1.224b35-5a3 that “to be moved is to be differently disposed now than before”). But transmutation capable of being caused by a created agent is either motion or change; therefore it necessarily presupposes a subject, and this a subject that remains the same under both terms [sc. beginning and ending of the change], because this belongs to the idea of the subject. But here [in the Eucharist] nothing remains the same under both terms unless the quantity remain the same; because if the prior does not remain the same the posterior does not remain the same, for in the many possible changes here, another subject could not be found save quantity.

324. Again, in Metaphysics 7.8.1033b8-19 the Philosopher proves that a generator generates only a composite. And he explains at the end of the chapter [9.1034b7-11, 1416] that “the argument not only shows of substance that a species or form does not come to be, but the argument is the same about all the categories, as about quality, quantity, and the other categories (as that a bronze sphere comes to be, not that sphere or bronze come to be);” “likewise in the other categories, for quality does not come to be but wood with a quality, nor does quantity come to be but a quantity of wood.” But here [in the Eucharist] a composite cannot be generated per accidens unless quantity be part of the composite; but the quantity needs to have been the same during the change, because according to the Philosopher there, “the matter must always pre-exist” that is changed toward form so that the composite might come to be.

325. Again, a natural agent cannot cause increase or decrease in the Eucharist, because this only belongs to animate things, to which nutrition also belongs, On the Soul 2.4.415b23-28, but the species in the Eucharist are not animate; therefore they cannot be increased or diminished. But there is no motion toward different quantities unless increase and decrease happen, as is plain from Physics 5.2.226a26-31, where these are put in the genus of quantity, just as alteration is put in the genus of quality.

326. To the contrary:

The species can be broken by the priest (as is plain to sense); therefore continuity can be removed; but continuity is the unity of the continuous. Therefore its unity is removed; therefore the same quantity does not remain as before in this change.

327. Again, a created agent can cause densification and rarefaction in these sorts of species; but there is greater quantity in the rare and less quantity in the dense.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines

1. Exposition of the Opinion Expressed in Two Conclusions

328. There is here an opinion [Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet XI q.3], which says that not only is it possible for the quantity here not to remain the same, but that there is altogether a different quantity in rarefaction and in densification of the species, such that, namely, nothing at all of what is prior remains in what is posterior and no part of the posterior was before in the prior.

329. He goes from this conclusion to another conclusion, namely that here there is motion without a subject and by a created agent, for it is sufficiently plain to sense that fire can rarefy the species as if they were in a subject.

330. He makes, however, an addition to this second conclusion, namely that “that according to which change happens first and per se is not altogether without a subject, because this sort of change happens according to the rare and dense; and this change happens according to hot and cold; and on this sort of change follows contraction and expansion; and so change according to quantity happens per accidens and as a consequence. And accordingly, because that according to which this change, as this change, happens first and per se is not without a subject, one can say that this motion is not wholly without a movable thing.”

331. And as if this response not suffice he adds, “However, because what is here posited for the subject (of that which change per se happens in accord with) is also changed, and no subject can be assigned for its change, therefore, by reason of this, motion in the matter at hand is said to be without a movable.

2. Two Reasons for the First Conclusion

332. For the first conclusion [n.328] argument is given as follows: the terms of motion must be incompossible (plain from Physics 5.3.7-10); therefore nothing of one term is anything that remains in the other, just as the incompossible is not in its incompossible.

333. If the position were held too that some quantity remained the same here, but the terms of change were the greater and lesser in the quantity remaining - this he himself rejects because “the subject and terms of motion must really differ;” but the quantity, and the greater and lesser in the quantity, do not really differ, “for it cannot be said that variation happens according to greater and lesser without variation happening as to the essence of quantity, since greater and lesser are only the quantum itself essentially.” In this way does he himself argue that the same whiteness cannot both remain in the change and vary from greater to lesser.

334. And the strength of this reasoning [n.332] rests on this, that the subject is really distinguished from each term, and in this especially that the subject remains under each term; but neither term remains under the other, since they are opposites.

335. Again, each part of what is rarer is rarer; therefore each part of what is rarer is greater in quantity; therefore each part is a quantum with a new quantity.

336. If you say that something altogether new does not follow but only something new as to a part - on the contrary: I take what the subject is of the part of quantity that is new; that subject is rarer than it was before (from the first proposition [n.335]); therefore it is greater than before; therefore too it is a quantum with a greater quantity; and consequently the new quantity, of which the subject is posited as subject, will be greater than the old quantity and yet not altogether other than it. Therefore, in the same way the quantity of the whole rare thing will be greater than the whole quantity of the dense thing, and yet not altogether new.

337. Here argument [sc. against this, n.336] is made in brief as follows. If the quantity that was before remains, I ask what subject it is in; only in the same as it was in before, because the accident does not migrate; therefore, the subject that was a quantum with this quantity before will now be a quantum with the same quantity. Therefore, it cannot, either in the whole of itself or in a part, be a quantum with another new quantity unless the same thing be at the same time a quantum with two quantities (which is impossible), or unless there is in the rarefaction an aggregation of new parts of the substance under the new quantity; and the aggregation of quantum parts with preexisting quantum parts is rarefaction. But this is nothing, because then no part of the rarer would be rarer formally; for an old part would not be rarer formally by the fact that another new part was made continuous with it.

3. Three Reasons for the Second Conclusion

338. For the second conclusion [n.329] he argues himself as follows (as it can be elicited from this words):

“Just as an accident has, by divine virtue, being without a subject in its ‘having been made’ and its ‘being at rest’, so too can it have being without a subject in its ‘coming to be’ and its motion” [Godfrey, Quodlibet XI q.3].

339. Another reason: “Because just as it has, by divine virtue, being without a subject, so too does it have everything by the same virtue, so that everything that can belong to it in a subject belongs to it without a subject. Therefore, just as extension could vary in a substance as to greater and lesser, and just as the substance would accordingly be said by participation to be greater and lesser, so too will this sort of change be able, when the extension remains without a subject, to come to be in another quantity without a subject” [ibid.].

340. Third: “Although motion does not exist in its complete idea (according to the course of nature that fits it) unless there is some one thing that, as to some form, is disposed differently now than it was before, yet to the essence of motion principally belongs the flow itself of the form, or the form itself in its ‘being in a state of becoming’.” Now this form [in a state of becoming] can well be found [here] even though no subject is differently disposed according to it; therefore too can the essence of motion be found [here].

4. Reasons Against the Second Conclusion and their Solution

341. Against the second conclusion [n.329] he intimates three reasons:

The first is of this sort: the greater quantity has not been drawn out from the potency of matter, for the quantity does not have a subject; but such an entity [sc. the greater quantity] is said to be created; and so, in such a change, a greater quantity cannot come to be save by creation.

342. Second, because the body of Christ remains under the species of bread as long as the accidents remain that affected the substance of the bread; but for you the quantity is altogether new, or different from before [n.328];     therefore , the body of Christ does not remain there, which however is not the position held.

343. Third as follows: “The being of successive things consists in the succession of parts as to prior and posterior; but there cannot be prior and posterior in motion unless there is something that varies as to prior and posterior; therefore etc     .”

344. And he responds to these arguments:

To the first [n.341] as follows, that because in this change there is not thus one thing and another thing that at some point has interrupted being - neither because, namely, it is corrupted in itself or something else like it is regenerated, nor because one thing is contrary to the other; rather is it of one idea in form and species, and in existing continuously and without interruption - therefore nothing prevents the idea of motion from being capable of being posited here.

345. And this reason could be applied to the first [n.341], namely because there is on this account no creation, “because there is no production of some new being of a thing corrupted in itself, but only the production of some being as to form and species according to a certain successive ‘coming to be’ of a thing conserved” [Godfrey, ibid.]

346. He does, however, say to the first [n.341] that “just as it was in the potency of the subject that a greater quantity could, without creation, be introduced after a lesser quantity by a created agent, so does this force remain in a separated quantity, so that a greater after a lesser is brought to be by a natural agent and without creation,- such that the term ‘from which’ is the quantity lesser in degree from which the motion begins, while the term ‘to which’ is the quantity greater in some other degree at which the change stops; but motion is the flow of quantity indeterminate between these two definite terms, and possessed of existence in quasi infinite degrees between them. But if some quantity were to come to be such that it would not have a relation to the pre-existing quantity, that quantity would properly be created” [Godfrey, ibid.] - In this final word does his response seem to stand, namely that there is no creation here, because the new quantity that is introduced has such a relation to the pre-existing quantity, because it succeeds to it by an uninterrupted flow, according to quasi infinite degrees in the form of the quantity.

347. To the second [n.342] he replies that “the body of Christ does not cease to be there because of just any variation in the species, but only because of such a variation as could not exist unless, along with the change of species, the substance of the bread and wine would, were it there, also change; and therefore, as long as the species remain in uninterrupted being under such rareness or extension, and so on about other features (but provided the bread could be affected by them), so long does the body of Christ remain there.”

348. To the third [n.343] he says that in motion that is toward quantity, whether it is per se, namely in increase, or is in rarefaction (as in the issue at hand [n.337]), it is not possible to take there a per se and primary order of any parts save in quantity; and thus will the separated species be understood to have an order in coming to be and in succession, because part will be able to succeed continuously to part when not in a subject just as when in a subject.

B. Rejection of the Opinion

1. About the First Conclusion

a. The Falsity of it in Itself is Shown

349. As concerns this opinion, there is only need to care much about the first conclusion [n.328] because of the second conclusion [n.329]. For the whole force of this question is: Since in certain changes that appear here (as change of place and the like), we can manifestly find some subject that remains the same under the terms of the change, and this by at least positing here, according to the common opinion [n.150], quantity alone without a subject, but since in a change whose terms are quantity it is not easy in this way to find a subject, then there cannot be here a change from quantity to quantity.

350. This difficulty is common, whether the whole succeeding quantity is new or a part of it is, because if a new part of change, however small, is granted, I will look for a subject of it. There is no need, then (as far as concerns the proposed view about a subject of change as to the quantity of what here appears), to reject the opinion that posits a whole new quantity more than to reject any other opinion that posits at least some new part of quantity - which everyone has to do, otherwise there would not then be more quantity than before.

351. However, Godfrey’s first conclusion [n.328] seems false.

352. The reason is that, if the subject does not remain the same, no accident of it remains the same; but for you the quantity of wine does not remain the same when it is rarefied [nn.328, 336]; therefore, no accident remains there the same because, according to the common opinion [n.150], any accident whatever is there in the quantity, whether mediately or immediately, and consequently the savor does not remain the same in number nor the color the same in number, and so forth.

353. And if it be said that it is an argument of the uneducated to take flight to the senses, because reason should judge about same and different if any objection is raised, since according to the Philosopher, Physics 8.3.254a30-33, it is fatuous to seek a reason there where we have something more certain than reason; it also seems strange if the senses cannot judge of the number of their proper sensibles, since number (according to the Philosopher On the Soul 2.6.418a17-20) is per se perceptible - these problems I give no weight to, because, as I have said elsewhere [Ord. II d.3 n.21], none of the senses judges whether the rays of the sun are continuously the same or different in a medium, although however that of which there is number or unity here is a proper sensible.

354. Passing this over, then, I argue as follows: it is not possible that agents, however much diverse, should induce the same form after corruption of the same thing; but whatever these sorts of species are rarefied by, whether by fire or the sun, such and such a savor and such and such a color are induced.

355. If you posit the accidents to be new [n.328], the argument goes more plainly as follows: The species of wine can be rarefied by fire; but all the qualities that appear there cannot be induced by fire, both because fire does not virtually contain in itself the qualities of mixtures, and because, if it does contain them, yet not accidents as greatly diverse in genus or species. But if the consecrated wine were here sweet and there bitter, the bitterness remains after rarefaction in these species and the sweetness in those, and so on as to any species at all of savor and any at all of colors (if, suppose, white wine is consecrated, or golden, or red). Therefore rarefying wine alone does not induce all these qualities; therefore they are not new. Therefore neither is the subject new, namely the quantity, without which they cannot remain the same.

b. Again, from the Statements of Him who Holds the Opinion

356. Argument secondly against this opinion from the statements of him who holds it. For he says that substance is individual formally through quantity; therefore, this bread is formally this bread through this quantity; therefore, when this quantity is corrupted, this bread no longer remains here, but a different singular bread does. Therefore, in any case of rarefaction the whole prior substance is corrupted and a new one generated.

357. This seems sufficiently improbable and against reason, because that such an alteration necessarily at once requires a new substance is to say that there cannot be variation as to the posterior if there is not variation as to the prior; and not a posterior in some way or other, but what is neither a proper passion nor consequent necessarily to the prior - which seems manifestly unacceptable.

c. About the Two Reasons Adduced for the First Conclusion

α. About the First Reason

358. The reasons for this conclusion do not prove it.

The first, about the incompossibility of the terms of motion or change [n.332], is solved by the fact that the major proposition is true of first terms, which are always privation and form; but the said proposition is not universally true of terms concomitant with the primary terms, as was said above in the opinion about forms, in distinction 10 question 2 the last article [d.10 nn.121-123].

359. And if you argue that here more and less are incompossible, I reply they are so as ultimately and completely informing the subject, but not as ‘less’ is something of ‘more’; otherwise it would be necessary to say, on the basis of this argument, that the whole quantity of the increased thing would be new, which is not probable but rather the parts of flesh in their species, which parts remain the same, are quanta with the same quantity as before; however, some quantity is new of the parts of substance that have come to it.

360. And when Godfrey himself afterwards deduces [n.333] that quantity is not moved from the greater to the lesser, I go along with him (and about quality likewise), because quantity and the greater and lesser in quantity (not speaking of the respect that ‘greater’ involves, but of the absolute that the respect presupposes as proximate foundation) are not essentially distinct, not even in the way the subject of motion must be distinct from the term of motion.

361. And therefore I simply concede the argument that some form of some genus does not change to greater and lesser within the genus; but the whole form, which is greater either in quantity or quality, does so - where I do not say that a per accidens being is the term ‘from which’ and that the whole form (which is lesser) is the term ‘to which’, or conversely; and yet the thing that is lesser could exist in the whole form, which is greater, as some element of it.

β. About the Second Reason

362. As to the second reason [n.335], look for the answer.a Unless perhaps the first proposition, “any part of the rarer is rarer,” is false save when speaking of parts according to species and not according to matter, in the way the proposition from On Generation 1.5.321a2-3 is true, that “any part of what is increased is increased.” And then one should say that rarefaction is not towards any uniform quality in the whole altered thing or any part of it. But in this way: the rarefying agent generates from some parts of the rarefi-able body some bodies finer than is the rarefi-able body; and because those bodies cannot be simultaneous with the other parts that still remain in their species (for ‘two bodies cannot be together’), therefore the parts expel the other parts from their place, and consequently the whole body occupies a greater place. And thus ‘to be rarer’ is nothing other than to have a greater number of finer bodies mixed, by juxtaposition, with the thing’s own parts- such that, in brief, ‘the rarer’ is what thus has finer corpuscles together with its own parts still remaining in their proper form. Nor is it surprising that some parts are able to be converted into a finer body before others are, because some parts are closer to the agent, and more quickly receive its action than others do.

a.a [Interpolation] A first response to the reason could be denial of the supposition tat, namely, rarity is the reason for the greater quantity, or the new superadded quantity; for rarity is a stretching out of extension, which extension is a mode of quality. Or in another way, by holding that rarity implies greater quantity, I concede the point when it is said that ‘any part of the rarer is rarer’ [n.336]; I distinguish ‘therefore any part is greater’; I deny ‘or according to the same quantity’; I thus concede ‘or according to different quantities’. When he says ‘therefore any part is a quantum with a double quantity, namely a new and a pre-existing quantity’ - this is denied. And when the proof is given ‘because, when the greater arrives, the lesser does not give way, therefore it gets greater and is the first part; therefore, they are two’ [n.337], I say the thing presupposed is false, because quantity is homogeneous, therefore it becomes one (as that, when two waters joined together, there are not two waters but one). However, the first response is truer [sc. first lines in this interpolation], as is plain at the end of the question in response to the third argument [n.420]

363. On the contrary: some parts are corrupted at once at the beginning of alteration, and so new substances will be generated; and likewise, everywhere is the body altered uniformly - the senses say this.

364. To the first [n.363] I say that the body is not more rare at once, because greater rarity is only established from occupation of greater place; but there is no greater occupation before there is heating in some noticeably greater degree.

365. To the second [n.363] I say that neither do the senses discriminate spirits or vapors in the air from the air, and yet spirits or vapors in the air are not of the same species as the air.

366. As to the second conclusion of this opinion [n.329], where the fundamental weight of this question lies (because, as was said before [nn.349-350], there is a difficulty in it against both opinions - namely both against the opinion that posits a new total quantity and against the opinion that posits its newness in part) - I argue against the aforesaid second conclusion, which allows motion from an agent and without a moveable subject, by bringing back the reasons that Godfrey himself brings forward against himself and which he tries to solve [nn.341-348].

a. About the First Contrary Reason and its Solution

367. First as to the first reason, about creation [n.341], as follows: what is as to the whole of itself and wholly brought into being from non-being is either created or at least requires a producing virtue equal to creative virtue; but this new quantity is, for you [n.341], brought as a whole and wholly into being; therefore.

368. Proof of the major:

First, because if it is totally produced after nothing, it is plainly a creation; but if it is produced after something and yet totally, this can only be by total conversion of that thing into this; or if you imagine another way, at least this transition requires an active virtue as equal as total conversion into this thing requires; but such a total conversion can only come from a virtue equal to divine creative virtue.

369. Second (and it is a confirmation of the preceding): when a succeeds to b, a is not, on account of its succeeding to b, of a different idea from b as concerns anything intrinsic to itself (this point is proved, first, because when a is in the process of succeeding, it is not then what it succeeds to; therefore what succeeds does not, on this account, vary in itself; second, because the order of what is posterior to this or that does not seem to vary the foundation of the order in itself). But if a succeeded to nothing and had its total being after non-being, it would be created; nor could it in any way be thus produced as a whole and wholly save by infinite virtue. Therefore, though it now succeed to any other thing whatever, yet, if it be produced as a whole and wholly, it would as a result, since the term is in itself altogether the same, require equal virtue for what is produced.

370. If you say that, because it succeeds to this thing, there is not as much productive virtue required as would be required if it succeeded only to nothing or to negation - this does not seem probable, because the term ‘to which’ does not require a different productive virtue save because of a different perfection in the term to be produced; therefore if the whole is wholly produced after something or after a nonsomething, an equal virtue is required.

371. Again, there is confirmation of this, because what has some term as a whole and wholly in its active power can put that term into being when it is not impeded; but it is not impeded by the fact that it does not have something positive that will be wholly changed from being to non-being, for it is fatuous to say that what is to be corrupted is an impediment to the agent; therefore, although it not have any such thing to be destroyed, it can put the whole effect wholly into being, and do so after nothing - and consequently it can create.

372. This reasoning [n.371] is confirmed, because if this quantity were to succeed to its contrary or its opposite, the objector would concede that it was created; but thus is the negation of it included in the pre-existing quantity, for any incompossible thing simply includes the negation of its incompossible and not in any way the affirmation of it - unless (by reason of a common subject) this preceding quantity no more has a subject in common with the succeeding quantity than the contrary has with the contrary; therefore this quantity just as much follows the negation of its being as it would if its opposite had preceded.

373. Against two things touched on in the response to the first reason:

The first is about the force remaining in the separated accident [n.367]. I argue as follows: nothing positive remains in a separated accident that was not in the accident as united [with a subject]; but there was no force in the accident as conjoined just because some term could be produced from it, but only because it was able to be the term of change and because another term was able to be drawn out from the potency of the subject; therefore in it as separated there was no force by which it could, with respect to alteration, have anything other than the idea of term. The first proposition, namely that ‘nothing positive is new in the separated accident’ was proved above in this distinction [nn.17-20].

374. Another thing he [Godfrey] adds at the end of his response, that if this quantity did not have a relation to the preceding quantity, then it would properly be created [n.372]. I add a minor: but this relation to the prior pre-existing quantity does not prevent the creation of it; therefore it is created. Proof of the minor: this relation is only a certain immediate succession of the being of this thing to the being of that; but such succession does not prevent the succeeding thing from being created. And this can be proved by an example, because the succession here is not more immediate than the being of the soul is to the organization of the body, and yet it is not denied that the soul is created in the organized body; therefore not here either. Now the reason in the former case is that the soul receives its whole being and receives it wholly after its not-being. And the same reason holds in the issue at hand, because this quantity receives its whole being and receives it wholly after its non-being.

375. But whether, along with the non-being, something positive preceded or nothing did, or whether even the contrary or the like preceded, it makes no difference to b, because the first terms there are the same as the terms of creation.

b. About the Second Contrary Reason and its Solution

376. Now I bring back the second reason, where he concedes the body of Christ remains as long as the accidents remain that are of a nature to affect the substance of the bread, though it would remain not precisely as long as these accidents remain the same in number [nn.342, 347]. To the contrary of this: because the quantity that succeeds to the pre-existing quantity is no more the same as the pre-existing quantity than is any other quantity in one other non-consecrated host; indeed it is less the same, because this succeeding quantity is incompossible with the pre-existing quantity in being, but that quantity [sc. the quantity in another non-consecrated host] is not so; therefore the body of Christ will not be more under the new quantity becauseThe text says ‘which was before’, but a variant says ‘because it was before’, and the variant looks to make more sense. ⁵² it was before under the other [pre-existing quantity] than it will be under any other quantity whatever, namely any quantity that is equally the same as the pre-existing quantity.

377. And if you take refuge in the succession of this quantity to that, I argue as follows: the body of Christ is under no quantity save by conversion and consecration;Sc. according to Godfrey’s opinion, not necessarily Scotus’. ⁵³ but by conversion and consecration it receives no being save under that quantity, and this [new] quantity is altogether different, just as is the quantity of another non-consecrated host; therefore, by this conversion and consecration it will not be under that [sc. new] quantity;     therefore it will not be under it in any way.

378. An argument could also be made through what was adduced against the first conclusion of the aforesaid opinion, through the statements of him who holds the opinion [n.356], that Christ’s body does not remain here under the species of bread longer than the bread that was converted would be of a nature to remain here; but the bread that was converted would not remain here under another quantity if bread is here through quantity; therefore etc     .

c. About the Third Contrary Reason and its Solution

379. As to the third response [n.348], which agrees with the third reason he adduces for himself as far as this conclusion is concerned, namely [n.343] that it is not of the essence of motion that some subject be differently disposed according to it - I do not argue against it because I believe the conclusion in itself to be true. But as to the issue at hand (because he concedes that, because of it, motion itself without a subject can be from a created agent [n.346]) I argue as follows: a created agent cannot make an accident in settled being without a subject; therefore, by similarity or a fortiori, it cannot cause an accident in flux without a subject.

d. About the Three Reasons Adduced for the Second Conclusion

380. On the above basis I respond to the reasons that he adduces for the second conclusion:

That the first reason [n.338] does well prove that God can make a form in flux or in coming to be, just as he can make it in settled being, without a subject; but it does not follow that a created agent can thus make a form in flux without a subject; rather the opposite follows, that it cannot make a form at rest without a subject, but as causing motion it causes in effect a form in flux.

381. The second reason [n.339], namely that God so endows a separated accident that everything can belong to it that could belong to it in a subject, proves the opposite, for nothing could belong to it in a subject save only that it was the term of motion; therefore, in no way could something else belong to it outside a subject. And so some other subject of motion must be granted, because, according to him [n.333], the subject of motion is different from the term of motion.

382. His third reason [n.340], namely that it is not of the essence of motion that the subject is in flux because of it, does well prove that God can make motion without a subject, but does not prove it of a created agent. For a created agent cannot separate anything at all from what is of the essence of it. Indeed, according to the response to the first reason [n.379] the opposite follows, because a created agent can no more separate a form from a subject in flux than from a subject in settled being; but a created agent cannot be the active cause of a form in settled being without a subject, therefore not of a form in flux either.

e. About the Statement Added in Exposition of the Second Conclusion

383. Against what he himself adds in exposition of the second conclusion [n.330], namely that motion which is here per se according to quality is not without a subject, although what accompanies (namely quantity) the per se term of this motion is without a subject - against this as follows: Rarity is the first formal term of the formal motion of rarefaction; but the subject of it is the whole quantum; therefore the whole quantum is naturally presupposed to the term. Therefore, so much quantum cannot per accidens be acquired by the fact that so much quality is acquired, because what is naturally prior and presupposed to something else is not acquired merely by the fact that what is naturally posterior is acquired; rather the prior is presupposed having already been acquired.

C. Scotus’ own Opinion

384. I reply, therefore, to the question that in the Eucharist while it abides a quadruple change can be discerned: one according to ‘where’, another according to a quality that is not accompanied by any variation in quantity, a third according to a quality that is accompanied by variation in quantity, a fourth according to quantity.

1. About the First Change

385. As to the first change it is manifest how it requires the same abiding quantity; for just as a ‘where’ in settled being is necessarily in a quantum as subject, so a ‘where’ in flux is necessarily in the same subject and requires the same quantum abiding under the same term.

2. About the Second Change

386. About the second change too it is manifest that the same quantity remains there and can, according to the common opinion, be the subject of the alteration, such that the quality in flux has the same quantity for its subject that the abiding quality is posited as having. And such change is, as to genus, either according to difference in shape, or according to difference in quality (of the third species [sc. sense qualities]) as to more and less; and this variation as to more and less does not destroy the accidents in the Eucharist insofar as they are necessary for the Eucharist (variation that destroys the Eucharist will be spoken of in what follows [q.2 nn.432-439]).

387. As to difference of shape, it would seem that it would destroy the quantity, according to the remark of Avicenna in his Metaphysics [II ch.2] that difference of dimension requires difference of quantity.

388. But this seems to be contrary to the senses, for it would be too hard to say that water would, as often as it was differently configured in different vessels, as often have a simply new quantity, even though the parts remained the same in themselves and in the whole. Configuration, therefore, only states, over and above quantity, a relation of parts to each other or of the limits that include the parts; but this relation can be changed while the parts remain the same in themselves and in the whole.

389. About quality of the third species too it is sufficiently manifest that, when the species remains the same through the whole motion, the quantity remains the same.

3. About the Third and Fourth Change

390. But about the third change (which is according to more and less), and the fourth change, there is doubt.

a. About the Third Change

391. Briefly, the common opinion (as was stated to the issue at hand), indeed every opinion, namely that ‘some quantity is new in rarefaction’ [nn.349-352], labors under the same difficulty as does also the opinion that posits the whole quantity to be new [n.328] - unless the way touched on is held to, that rarefaction is a certain juxtaposition of finer bodies within the parts of a grosser body [n.362]. Now, according to this way, the difficulty would be avoided, save that it is difficult to see how in this case a body finer than wine could be generated from fire or the sun - and on this point one must speak the way that will be stated in the following question [n.431]. There is also the other difficulty that, as quickly as the species would be rarefied, some new substance would at once be there, and consequently that Christ’s body is not everywhere there.

392. It also seems strange that no substance could be changed from rare to dense, or conversely, when it remains altogether the same.

393. But what about when the common opinion is held to, that another quantity is there [in the Eucharist], and without a subject [n.350] (whether the whole is new or not the whole, I care not)? Will this be able to be by a created agent?

394. I say no:

First because what is conserved immediately by God cannot be corrupted by a created agent; for on this account supernatural accidents cannot be destroyed by a creature as efficient cause (the reason for which is that no created cause can have an active virtue superior to the virtue of the cause that conserves the accidents in their being); but quantity here has supernatural being immediately from a supernatural cause conserving it;     therefore etc     .

395. Again, quantity in a subject is not destroyed by a contrary, because it does not have a contrary; therefore, it is destroyed only through a defect of the subject, or of something necessarily consequent to it. But it cannot be destroyed here by destruction of the subject, because it is here without a subject; nor in the second way, because no other accident that is in the subject necessarily follows quantity.

396. If you ask, then, by what cause a new quantity is induced, I say it is immediately by God alone. Nor yet by a new miracle, because by the will by which he has disposed the Eucharist to exist in the Church he has disposed that, as concerns species when an active natural cause is present, he would cause the sort of change in converted substances that a natural agent would cause - and this lest, if the species here were seen to be unchangeable, the merit of faith be emptied.

397. This way cannot be refuted by the senses, because it preserves everything that appears to the senses; nor refuted by reason, because if you argue that it takes from a natural agent its proper action, I say that it does not take away the action that can belong to a natural agent, namely that it change the substance of bread from form to form; but it does deny to a natural agent the action that cannot belong to it, namely to cause change and not change any subject.

398. An alternative statement when holding the common opinion in this issue, namely that in rarefaction there is a new quantity (not wholly new but partly so) in the same subject [n.391], is that there is in quantity as it is in a subject a movement of rarefaction by which there is per accidens some new degree of quantity, but yet without a subject; nor is there a new miracle, because the new part is as it were combined with the existing quantity; nor is it a new miracle that a quantity combined with a separated quantity has the like way of existing, or has separation - as is exemplified of the parts of flesh generated from the food existing in Christ; for, in the same way that the Word assumed human nature, the parts of flesh generated from the food are assumed into the unity of person of the Word. So here [in the Eucharist], by the same miracle by which quantity is made separate from a subject, by that miracle is it made to be the case that whatever is part of the same quantity is likewise separate.

399. Against this view [n.398] there is first that another quantity could be added to this quantity, as would be if non-consecrated wine were added to the consecrated species, and the added quantity is not without a subject the way the quantity is that it is added to.

400. Nor is the above reason nor the likeness [n.398] to the purpose, because the parts generated from food were parts of some whole that was assumed by the Word; but these parts [sc. of quantity in the Eucharist] do not become parts of a whole that has separated being primarily, of which the consequence is that, though a part receive the like being of the whole without a new miracle, yet a part does not receive the like being of another part without a new miracle. And because the rareness of the whole is the per se term of alteration, the whole has the whole quantity for its proper subject, just as a part has part of the quantity for subject; therefore, that whole quantity presupposes this whole quantity - therefore is it greater than it; and consequently the quantity is naturally greater before this rareness is introduced.

401. In brief one must, as to this article, either hold the second opinion, that the quantity is in no way by another action of a created agent, or say that a created agent could act without a passive subject on which to act.

402. But the first option appears improbable to some.

403. The second can in some way be explained, namely: a created agent’s not requiring a passive subject, or anything supplying its place, seems to destroy the foundations of natural philosophy, (Physics 1.7.190a14-15, 9.192a31-32; On Generation 1.4.320a2-5 and often elsewhere), because there would be no need for anything the same to underlie the terms of change.

404. It also seems to destroy what appears to the senses, for an agent that has the term completely within its active virtue can, if not impeded, put that term into being; therefore, a created agent could put that term into being without any passive subject, and thus it could make an accident without a subject and a substantial form without matter -which seems manifestly contrary to the senses.

405. Hence a created agent requires a passive subject for two reasons, namely because of itself - for the passive subject is a cause that shares together with the created agent, since a created agent has a limited virtue in acting and so requires another cause, namely a material cause, to be concurrent with it in the coming to be; and also because of the effect, which is composed of matter as its pre-existing part and of form as the arriving part. Therefore, a created agent should not be posited as acting altogether without matter, whether matter in itself or in something equivalent.

406. But it would be said that the First Being supplies the place of the subject in relation to a created agent. The proof of this is that, just as the First Being can supply the place of the subject in relation to a created agent as concerns settled being in regard to an accident, so this Being can supply the place of the subject in regard to the agent as to the coming to be of the effect (proof: a cause seems to be required more for the effect than for another cause in the causing; now a subject in regard to an accident has the idea of cause, but an accident in regard to an agent and causer has the idea of co-cause only;     therefore etc     .).

407. The manner of this conclusion, then, is this, that a created agent does not act without a subject in itself or in something supplying the place of the subject; and yet, in the issue at hand, although there is no subject in itself, yet God supplies the place of a subject, that is, the extrinsic causality that would belong to the subject if it were present -and this insofar as the extrinsic cause is required as co-cause along with the created agent. And this is possible, just as it is possible for God to supply the place of the cause with respect to the caused effect; for the cause does not depend on the co-cause more than the effect caused depends on both causes.

408. But against this [n.407] it is again argued:

Because the causality of the subject is reception of the form; but it is impossible for God, whether in himself or anything else, to have the idea of receptivity to form.

409. Again, if a created agent requires a passive subject, that is, as co-cause and this in idea of being receptive of form, then a created agent cannot act on such a passive subject without a new miracle; and so, once some such thing is posited to supply the place of the subject, the fact that the created agent does act will be a new miracle. But in miraculous action the created agent does not act wholly of itself; therefore, one must return to the fact that the action is not by a created agent.

b. About the Fourth Change

410. About the fourth change, which is in quantity in itself, the thing is easier. For here there is no possible action as to growth and diminution, because the species are then not animate; but action here is possible as to addition and subtraction; for the surface can be divided into parts, and some quantum can be added to it.

411. As to division I say that it is not properly a change of the same subject but is only a certain reduction to act of parts that were in potency, that is, were indistinct, in the whole before - I mean reduction to distinct act, because the parts were continuous, and so in a way one, in the whole before, and afterwards, outside the whole, they are discontinuous.

412. But if the question is altogether about the subject here in such qualitative change, I reply that the subject can be posited to be the parts as they remain according to the same entity (albeit not the parts with the dividing up we understand when we speak of parts in act), because they were in the whole and afterwards outside the whole according to the same positive entity; but in the whole they had continuity, which prevents the actuality that includes dividing up, while outside the whole they do have that actuality, so that the parts are changed from form to privation of form. And thus there is no generation here but, as it were, corruption without generation, because the entity, which is now positive in each part, existed as a totality before, although it did not exist before under the dividing up (namely, not being along with something else) that it now exists under; and the entity of the whole, which existed before, does not now remain.

413. It is plain, therefore, how this change does not require the same remaining quantity (speaking of the sameness that is continuity), but it does require sameness speaking of whatever here and there is positive, although a positive differently disposed.

414. As to addition, I say that it is possible for another quantity to be added to this one and to be continuous with it, and this while no subject, except perhaps the continuous parts, remains the same (as was said before in the case of division [n.411]). And thus the quantity will not only be the same with sameness of continuity but also with the same positive sameness that preceded the continuity, namely the quantity that is in this part and likewise in that whether they are continuous or discontinuous.

415. And this difficulty is common to any union or division. For if either union or division is change, and you ask for its subject, nothing common remains save the entities of the divided or united parts, and that entity, when union is made, has something separate which it lacks when there is division, namely some relation of the united pars or the continuity of them (speaking of quanta). And thus the change is universally privative in the case of division but positive in the case of continuity.

416. And if you argue “if some quantum is added to this one, and is made continuous with this species, then there is the same limit in act for both of them; the limit then is either in a subject or without a subject” - look for the response.a

a.a [Interpolation] It is said that the body of Christ is not under anything indivisible, nor under anything that is not part of the quantum; the limit then or the line, since it is not part of the quantum,A line is the limit or division of a surface (a quantum in two dimensions) and not a part of it, just as a point is the limit or division of a line (a quantum in one dimension) and not a part of it. A line, then, has a subject, since it is an attribute of quantity, but the quantity or quantum of which it is the attribute does not have a subject. ⁵⁴ is not realized on the side of what is without a subject.

     If you say that there is no greater reason for it to be realized on the side of this than of that - denied, because the line is in a subject, though it is not part of the [sacramental] host.

417. It could also be said, though less probably, that the breaking up or division of parts of a quantity is only a certain local motion, and exists in the things relocated as in a subject; but then it would be necessary to say, conversely, that continuity is nothing but a certain relocating, because relocating does not make for continuity but contiguity only.

II. To the Initial Arguments

418. To the first argument [n.323] I say that it is not of the essence of motion that it belong to such or such a being, nor of change that it be of something disposed in such a way, just as it is not of the essence of whiteness that it be of something possessing whiteness. But just as a form in settled being is in itself essentially of the sort it is, though it not be the form of anything, so motion is essentially a certain potential actuality, so to say, and change is a certain disposing differently, though it not belong to any [subject] denominated by this or that [disposition].

419. To the second [n.324] I say that just as the Philosopher conceded that a subject is necessary in the case of change or motion (because the subject would pre-exist the formal term and would be part of the formal term), so he said that the composite is the total term of this production. But for us the antecedent is not simply necessary.

420. To the third [n.325] I say that some change different from change in growth or diminution is possible in quantity, as division and being made continuous, and this as change in itself; but rarefaction and densification are change per accidens, and consequently the species [in the Eucharist] cannot grow or be diminished properly speaking, yet they can change from a lesser quantity to a greater quantity and conversely.

Question Two. Whether Change Corruptive of the Accidents is Possible in the Eucharist

421. As for corruptive [or destructive] change I ask whether it is possible for some change to occur corruptive of the accidents in the Eucharist.

422. It seems not:

Because “form is simple and consists of an invariable essence” Book of Six Principles [ch.1 n.1];     therefore etc     .

423. Again, Boethius On the Trinity [ch.2] “A simple form cannot be a subject.”

424. Again, “Matter is that by which a thing can be and not be,” Metaphysics [7.7.1032a20-22].

425. And from all these one gets that at least a simple form cannot be corrupted; but a separate accident in the Eucharist is a simple form in this way;     therefore etc     .

426. Again, if [a separate accident] were corrupted, it would be corrupted either into a substance or into an accident or into nothing. Not into nothing because then a creature would be annihilated; nor into an accident because then a creature would cause an accident without a subject; nor into substance, because a substance cannot come to be from an accident;     therefore etc     .

427. On the contrary:

The accidents can be broken, crushed, and digested (it is plain to sense, and is proved from a Gloss on I Corinthians 12Gloss on I Corinthians 11.24, from Nicholas of Lyra, “Each receives his own part, the body of Christ is eaten in parts, and it remains whole. From which is plain that the whole and uncorrupted body of Christ is eaten; and if there is breaking or dividing into parts there, it seems to be not in the body but in the sacrament.” ⁵⁵); but nutriment is converted into the substance of the thing to be nourished;     therefore etc     .

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas and Rejection of it

428. It is said here [Aquinas, Sentences IV d.12 q.1 a.2] that, “subsistent being, which belongs to the dimensions that remain, is in conformity with the form that the substance of the bread had before;” and therefore “the being in which the dimensions subsist is taken away by the same events by which it would be taken away when the substance of bread exists there, and for this reason the accidents that remain are corrupted in the same way as they were capable of being corrupted before. But they were able to be corrupted in two ways before. In one way while the substance of the bread remains. In another way through corruption of the substance that comes about from change of the accidents, for just as generation is the term of alteration, so also is corruption; on the part of quantity too, because since each thing has a determinate quantity, division can be done to such an extent that the species will not remain. Sometimes, therefore, when a change happens in this sacrament, the dimensive being, conform to the preceding substance, still remains; sometimes the aforesaid being is taken away, and then the sacrament ceases to be. Likewise on the part of quantity, because if division is made into parts of as much quantity as suffices for the species of bread and wine, then, although the dimensions are different (because the parts of the continuum are brought into act that were before in potency), yet the being conform to the pre-existing substance remains. But if the quantity of the parts is not sufficient for this, both beings (namely both dimension and the aforesaid being [sc. the being conform to the pre-existing substance]) cease to be; and therefore the body of Christ at that point ceases to be there under the sacrament.”

429. Now as to what thing this corruption, when it is possible, will be made into, it will be touched on in the following question [nn.495-502].

430. Against the principal conclusion, which states that the dimension can be removed in the same way as it would be if a substance existed, because the dimension has being in conformity with the substance of bread - I argue as follows:

This conformity cannot be understood to be in any new positive thing, because no such new positive thing comes to the accident by the fact that it is without a subject; rather, what comes to it conform to the substance is only in the negation ‘does not inhere [in a substance]’; but conformity in this negation does not suffice for the accident’s being taken away with that one form; for the being of substance is taken away for this reason, that it is a passive subject proportioned to a natural agent, namely a subject possessed of a potential part and an actual part, of which the potential part can exist without the actual part - and as the accident possesses conformity only in negation, it does not have any such parts;     therefore etc     .

431. Again, a composite substance necessarily determines for itself some quality of its own, and especially according to him, who posits that the substance is corrupted upon corruption of the quality (which would not be the case if substance did not necessarily determine some quality for itself). But quantity does not necessarily determine any quality for itself; for it as indifferent to the contrary of this quality as it is to the quality, and as indifferent to one degree of it as to another degree; because no quality, and no degree of quality, emerges from the principles of quantity.

B. Scotus’ own Opinion

432. I say, then, to the question that accidents proper to the Eucharist can be corrupted.

433. And this, according to the common opinion [n.150], is sufficiently manifest about the qualities whose change does not require another quantity, because those qualities can be posited as having an abiding common subject, namely quantity.

434. But according to the other opinion [n.151], which posits that the quantity of substance does not differ from substance, nor the quantity of whiteness from whiteness, and consequently that here no quantity is more separate from a subject than the substance of which it is the quantity - according to this opinion it is not equally easy to save the corruption of the quality. For it would then be necessary to posit that any quality is, by equal reason, without a subject, just as also that each of them might change without a subject. And then this position returns to the second difficulty touched on in the preceding question [nn.391-395], how the Eucharist is corrupted by corruption of quantity, and how quantity could be new.

435. However, to the conclusion in general, one could argue as follows: the virtue of an agent is not determined by the fact an accident is without a subject; but if an accident were in a subject, it could be corrupted by a created agent;     therefore etc     .

436. This conclusion does not follow from the reasoning, because the virtue by itself of an equal agent does not suffice, but there is need for it to have a passive object proportioned to it so that it may act as it did before.

437. I reply: as long as the quantity remains, it is easy (according to the common opinion) to preserve a passive object in relation to a natural agent; and this is very possible in regard to contrary qualities, because not every alteration, even between contraries, requires the quantity to change and yet, in such alteration toward quality (with which the species of bread cannot stand), the Eucharist ceases to be; for God has only made institution to conserve the Eucharist (that is, the existence without a subject of the accidents in which is the body of Christ) as long as the qualities remain there that are of a nature to perfect already converted substances. Therefore, the point is simply saved that the Eucharist can cease to be by action of a natural agent. Nor is there any new miracle there, since by the same previous will by which God willed the Eucharist to be in the Church he has also willed that it only remain as long as the qualities would remain that are of a nature to perfect already converted substances.

438. Now as to corruption of the Eucharist by corruption of quantity, statement of what agent it could be done by was made in the preceding question [nn.394-409].

439. And as to whether a new substance must return in conversion of the Eucharist by conversion or change in quantity, statement will be made in the following question [n.490].

II. To the Initial Arguments

440. As to the first of the initial arguments [n.424]: the author is speaking of the six principles he is making determination about; now these principles are relational forms coming from without. Hence the author is not speaking of absolute forms.

441. To the second [n.423] it can be said that Boethius is speaking of a form that is pure form, that is, pure act, as in the example he gives there about God. And this is true of a form that is not of a nature to perfect something potential, because it is not of a nature to receive an accident. And so it is about the divine essence. Unless perhaps an objection is made about angelic essence and about intellection - but this point is discussed in the question about the simplicity of an angel, whether it has matter [as in Bonaventure, Richard of Middleton, Godfrey of Fontaines, Giles of Rome, and others; Scotus Ord.II d.3 p.1 q.4].

442. As to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 7 [n.424], it is plain that he would not concede that anything can be corrupted unless it were to have potency distinct from act as part distinct from part; but he would posit this because he posits an order of simply necessary causes, or because he would posit simply that nothing can be corrupted save that of which a part remains after corruption, just as he posits that nothing can properly be generated save that of which a part existed before in advance of generation. But we do not agree with him in the order of causes nor in this separation of part from whole.

443. To the fourth argument [n.426] I say that quantity is not corrupted into nothing, but into another contrary quality or a quality of a different degree in the same species; for a new quality has the same subject that the prior quality also had, or at least (as far as concerns itself) could have. But if you speak of the corruption of a quantity to which no other prior subject can be assigned - that quantity is not corrupted by the action of a natural agent without a subject either pre-existent (which was spoken of in the preceding question [nn.394-395]) or newly created (which will be spoken of in the following question [nn.469-471]).

Second Article: About Change with which the Eucharist does not Remain

Single Question. Whether in Any Change that is Made in the Eucharist Some Substance Must Return by Divine Action

444. Finally I ask whether in any change that is made in the Eucharist some substance must return by divine action.

445. It seems not:

Because a separate quantity has the mode of a substance in acting, so does it have it in coming to be and undergoing; therefore whatever can be generated from a substance, were it there, will be able to be generated from a separate quantity; there is no need, then, for some substance to return.

446. Again, a natural agent next to a passive subject naturally changes it; therefore no miracle is required for it to cause change; but the substance cannot return save through a new miracle; therefore no possible change there requires a substance to return.

447. Again, an unimpeded natural agent acts necessarily, so it does not depend in its acting on any action that belongs immediately to the divine will, for the divine will is a principle of external action only contingently; but what is necessary cannot depend on what is contingent; therefore nothing that is caused immediately by the divine will is required in the action.

448. Again, Augustine says, City of God 7.30, “God so manages the things he has established that he allows them to perform their own motions.” Therefore, he allows a natural agent to perform its own natural motion, and consequently to change the Eucharist without any new miracle; therefore also without a substance returning.

449. On the contrary:

The species [of the Eucharist] are able to give nourishment, as the gloss [Lombard ad loc.] says on I Corinthians 11.21, “One indeed is hungry, another is drunken;” so they can be changed into the substance of someone needing nourishment;     therefore substance can be generated from them. But this is only possible if substance return, because substance does not come to be from non-substance.

450. Again, it is plain to sense that the consecrated host can be corrupted into fire, or into a living thing generated by way of putrefaction, just as it would be corrupted if the substance of bread were there; and then, as before [n.449], a substance can only be generated if substance return; therefore etc     .

I. To the Question

A. First Opinion, which is from Pope Innocent III

1. Exposition of the Opinion

451. There is an opinion here from Innocent III On the Sacrament of the Altar 4.11,“Just as the substance of the bread is miraculously converted when the Lord’s body begins to be under the sacrament, so it somehow miraculously returns when his body ceases to be there.” ⁵⁶ which says the substance of bread returns.

452. This can be proved as follows, that Christ is in the Eucharist as spiritual nourishment, and suitable bodily nourishment remains as long as the species exist; therefore when the species cease to have the idea of suitable nourishment (as substances unsuitable for nourishment bodily would be if they were in the substance of bread and wine), then the body of Christ really ceases to be there as spiritual nourishment; but when the Eucharist ceases, the substance returns. Therefore in such change the substance returns.

453. Nor must one posit a new miracle here, because the body of Christ ceases to be there when the species would not be of a nature to affect the substances converted, for God has instituted the Eucharist not to remain unless suitable species remain.

454. Nor too is there a new miracle because, namely, the substance returns there when the body of Christ ceases to be there, for God has ordained accidents never to be without a subject save in the Eucharist.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

455. Against this: I ask when the substance of bread returns.

456. Either this is in the final instant, when a new substance is generated there, and then it follows that bread and non-bread are there together; for bread is corrupted when something different is generated,Understand: “so, in the same way, something different is corrupted when bread is generated” and, since the bread is there first, the non-bread that is corrupted is there along with the bread. ⁵⁷ and for you the bread is there first, and this is unacceptable.

457. Or it is before the final instant, and then two unacceptable things seem to follow:

The first is that the Eucharist does not remain as long as the non-corrupted species remain, or that the Eucharist will remain there at the same time and that the substance of bread will be there along with the body of Christ.

458. The second unacceptable thing is because, when one part of the motion is no more repugnant to the receptive subject than another part is (this is apparent from what was said above in q.1 [nn.367-372]), an agent that has power for part of the motion has power for the whole of the motion and for the term. But, as long as the species are not simply corrupted but are being altered otherwise, one part of the alteration is no more repugnant to the species than another part is; therefore an agent with power for one part of the alteration has power also for any degree of it; so while the alteration remains the substance should not return.

459. But, as to this argument, it would be more probable to grant the second member [n.457].

460. And then the first thing inferred [n.457] would perhaps not be unacceptable to one holds the opinion; for he would say that the Eucharist does not remain when the species are disposed in just any way but as long as they remain as suitable for nourishment. But the species could be so altered that, before they are totally corrupted, they are not suitable for nourishment, just as bread, before the flavor and the other accidents were corrupted [sc. in the process of eating?], could not be suitable nourishment; and then it would be difficult to find the definite degree of alteration or putrefaction up to which precisely the Eucharist would remain.

461. To the second [n.458] it might be said that the substance ought not to return on account of the whole alteration that precedes the corruption of the species and, consequently, the corruption of the Eucharist, but that it ought to return on account of the generation that follows the alteration and accompanies the corruption of the species; but it cannot return when the corruption is going on, because then it would both be and not be.

462. But this response does not assign a return of the substance of the bread that is sufficient; for a natural agent could, for you, do as much up to the final instance if the substance of the bread did not return; so the response does not speak sufficiently.

B. Second Opinion, which is that of Thomas Aquinas

1. Exposition of the Opinion

463. There is another opinion [Thomas Aquinas, Sentences IV d.12 q.1 a.2, ST IIIa q.77 a.5] that posits return of the matter.

463. The exposition, however, is that the opinion cannot be understood of the matter that was previously annihilated, “because what has been reduced to nothing cannot return numerically the same.” Nor can it be understood either of matter previously converted into the body of Christ, because this matter cannot return again unless the body of Christ or the matter of the body of Christ were, contrariwise, converted into the matter of bread, just as neither could the converted bread return unless the body of Christ were converted into bread.

465. But if this opinion is to be sustained with any probability, the understanding of it needs to be that God creates new matter. And one must not posit a new miracle, because this comes from the original miracle (lest faith lose its merit), and consequently so that every change that could be brought about if the accidents were in a substance could be brought about by a natural agent. Nor would the substance of bodily matter then simply be diminished, nor the matter created in the beginning increased, by the return of this substance, because as much of matter is created, or as much returns here, as was converted from matter into the substance of the body of Christ.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

466. I argue against this opinion: because I ask when the matter returns - whether in the final instant, when a new substance is generated there, or before the final instant?

467. Not before for two reasons: because then, while the Eucharist remains, the matter of the substance there would be different from the matter of the body of Christ, which the school in common does not hold. Then too the matter would be without form, which that doctor [Aquinas, ST Ia q.66 a.1 ad 3, q.76 a.6] says is simply impossible; at least it is not possible without a new miracle. But more miracles are not to be posited without necessity.

468. If however the matter returns in the instant of generation, in vain is it posited to return so that a natural agent may generate something from it, because a natural agent only generates from a matter quantum, especially according to him [Aquinas]. Likewise, a natural agent can only generate if some corruption accompanies the generation, and especially according to this opinion; but it will not corrupt any substance then [sc. in the instant of generation], because the matter does not return under any substantial form needing to be corrupted, for then it would have matter and not have matter at the same time.

469. The manner too, in which this doctor says the opinion must necessarily be held (namely that annihilated matter does not return nor does converted matter, but it can only be said to return because some new matter is created), does not seem probable, because both annihilated matter and converted matter can return.

470. Proof of the first point:

Because the nothing that follows annihilation is of the same idea as the nothing that precedes creation of matter, just as the term of annihilation ‘to which’ and the term of creation ‘from which’ are the same or of the same idea, as in the case of corruption and generation. And the distance from matter to the nothing that follows the annihilation of it and to the nothing that precedes the creation of it is the same; therefore the same power has power over this distance and that; therefore the power that can create can also repair what has been annihilated.

471. Again, matter that has been annihilated is not more nothing than it was before creation; therefore, it does not include a greater contradiction than it included before; therefore just as omnipotence could previously have produced what was thus nothing, so can it produce it now as well.

472. Second, namely about converted matter [n.469], the proof is that the body of Christ is not differently disposed because of the fact that bread is converted into it. Therefore, conversely, the converted bread could return in the same way in which it was converted into that body, without its being the case that Christ’s body would be in itself differently disposed; because just as this body is not disposed in a different way positively by having this entity after conversion in itself [sc. the entity of being under the species of bread], so it would not be disposed in a different way privatively by not having it in itself (namely if the bread were to return).

C. Third Opinion, which is that of Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent

1. Exposition of the Opinion

473. The third opinion [Giles of Rome, Theorems on Christ’s Body prop.45, Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 8 q.36] is that, as the Commentator says (Physics 1 com.64 and Substance of the Sphere 1), one must understand the dimensions in the matter of generable and corruptible things to be indeterminate before the advent of substantial form, otherwise the division of matter for the sake of diverse substantial forms being in diverse parts of matter could not be understood. But these sorts of dimensions receive, after the arrival of substantial forms, determinate and complete being; but whatever is understood to be in matter before substantial form remains numerically the same in the generated and corrupted thing, because a prior thing should remain after removal of a posterior one. Just as, therefore, the matter of the bread would, by means of these incomplete dimensions, receive the form of that which might be generated from the bread, and this when the bread has not been converted, so since now [sc. in the converted bread in the Eucharist] subsistence is granted to the dimensions and since being conform to the being of the prior substances is granted to them, so there is granted to them that they are able to be under a substantial natural form; for they do not have from their nature the ability to be only under an accidental form, but they do have this ability from a substantial form. And then matter will either come as a consequence, because of the natural concomitance of form with matter, or the nature of matter will be given by divine virtue to the dimension itself, because of dimension’s nearness to matter, so that, in this way, what is generated is a composite of matter and form.

474. Added to this opinion is that if from such dimensions a worm were generated of matter first, then substance were generated from the nutrient parts, the matter of the nutriment will eventually be the matter of that substance.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

475. Against this opinion:

A form determinate to some receptive subject can in no way perfect something different, as whiteness cannot perfect an angel nor wisdom a stone; but a substantial form is determinate to substantial matter, as to what is properly susceptive of it; therefore in no way can it perfect a dimension in the genus of quantity, which is not substantial matter.

476. Again, a form of a prior genus cannot perfect what is receptive of a posterior genus; therefore neither can substantial form perfect the dimension of bread. The proof of the antecedent is that act presupposes potency, and this when speaking of the order of origin; but the act of a prior genus does not presuppose, in either origin or perfection, anything of a posterior genus.

477. Again third, and it seems more manifest, is that substantial form is the sort of act that is of a nature to constitute something per se one with what is perfectible by it; but it cannot constitute something per se one in the genus of quantity.

478. Again, that which is essentially the idea of being the term of another thing’s dependence, cannot depend on that other thing; substantial form is of this sort with respect to quantity;     therefore etc     .

479. Again, how can a substantial form be drawn out from the potency of dimension, since a substantial form, by the nature of the thing, is not in dimension as in what is properly potential for it?

480. Thus does the first part of the opinion [n.473] seem refuted in general, namely because dimension cannot take the place of matter with respect to substantial form.

481. But as to generation from that dimension [sc. the quantity in the Eucharist], there is refutation in particular.

First as follows: fire generated from that dimension and fire from the substantial form of fire would not be something univocal, and [the former] would not be univocally fire with another fire generated from the substantial form and matter of fire; and then fire would not act univocally in burning the [sacramental] host and in burning wood.

482. Again, not only does an absurdity follow in this one case, that mathematical fire will come from quantity and substantial form, but there will be a process in generable and corruptible things of this sort up to the end of the world; for from the mathematical fire, having dimension for the matter, water will be generated, having the same thing for the matter that the corrupted thing had for matter; and from that water will be generated air, and so on to the end of the world, or to infinity according to the philosophers.

483. What the other doctor adds, about the matter of arriving nutriment [n.474], does not save the proposed opinion.

Posit that what is generated is, like fire, not nourishable: the argument is worth nothing.

484. Again, let it be that a priest were nourished from the species, and posit, as would be possible that, for the long time during which the many parts of matter would have been in flux, new parts would always have been generated - the result is that those parts will not truly be parts of flesh, constituted of the essential parts of flesh, as the other parts would be that were not generated from the species; and thus it would be possible to posit the case of a child who, nourished on species until the end of his life, would rise again only as a human being composed of dimension and of one or several substantial forms, according to them.

D. Fourth Opinion, which is that of Richard of Middleton

1. Exposition of the Opinion

485. The fourth opinion [Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.12 princ.2 ad1] is that in transubstantiation there is converted along with the accidents, and this by creation, a possibility for change not only into form but also into the lowest degree of actuality, which is matter; therefore, the accidents are afterwards resolved into matter from the aforesaid possibility annexed to them, having been converted into a naturally made actuality of the lowest degree.

486. And thus does this opinion agree with the second [n.465], namely that matter returns, but not immediately from God; rather by the action of a natural agent.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

487. Against this opinion is that this ‘pure possible’ is, according to him, the term of creation; therefore it is something outside its cause, or it has outside the first cause a positive entity inferior to matter. But this is false, because Augustine says in Confessions 12.7 n.7, “Lord, you have made two things: one near you (namely angelic nature) and another almost nothing (namely prime matter);” therefore, in fact there is nothing inferior to matter, though perhaps it is possible for some inferior positive thing to be created by God. But whatever may be the case with this, disputation about it has no place here.

488. To the proposal I argue as follows:

Matter is not produced by generation, since it is the foundation that is presupposed to generation; therefore, a natural agent cannot convert that pure potential, annexed to the species, into prime matter or the composite, such that it produce, by that action, prime matter or matter proper to this composite.

489. Again, let it be that such a pure potential were posited in the species of the Eucharist, and that it were possible for matter or the composite to be produced from the action of a natural agent; it would still be vainly posited, because a natural agent can only act on a quantum in act, which would not be the case here.

E. Scotus’ own Opinion

490. I say to the question, therefore, that among the changes possible in the Eucharist some (1) stand while the Eucharist remains, some (2) do not. None of the first require the substance to return, not by divine action nor by action of a natural agent, and in fact the substance does not return. But of the second some (3) do not require the substance to return, yet (4) it does by divine action return; so that there are four conclusions.

491. The first is proved thus: every agent having power for some change has power for the term of it, provided it has a receptive subject no more repugnant to the term than to the motion. But in changes where the Eucharist remains, a natural agent has power for the whole motion, and the receptive subject is no more repugnant to the term than to the motion.     Therefore etc     .

492. The minor is plain, because the receptive subject cannot be said to be the quantity here; and one degree of quality to which there can be alteration or change is no more repugnant to the quantity than is another more imperfect degree according to which, and according to others like it, there can be a motion of alteration; for quantity in its idea does not determine any degree of quality for itself.

Thus is the first conclusion plain, that, while the Eucharist remains, there is no need for the substance to return.

493. And the third conclusion [n.490] can be proved by the same point, that change corruptive of the Eucharist, while yet the same quantity remains there that is the subject of the change, does not require the substance to return.

494. The proof of the second conclusion [n.490] is that, while the Eucharist remains, only the substance of the body of Christ is there - for the accidents then remain without a subject. But neither of these would be true if another substance were to return; therefore, while the Eucharist remains, no substance in fact returns.

495. The fourth conclusion is unlike the second, and it is this: that if the Eucharist is corrupted either by alteration or by motion in quantity, the substance in fact returns; and this is composite substance, to which such accidents belong, which also they affect; and it returns in the instant of corruption and immediately from God.

496. The proof of the first part of this conclusion [n.495] is that God has established that the species, while they remain, exist in the Eucharist precisely, and not elsewhere, without a subject;     therefore etc     . He has established, then, that when the Eucharist ceases, the species are not there without a subject, and consequently that in the very instant of corruption some substance is there.

497. The proof of the second part [n.495] is that if a substance does return there, yet not one different from that which can be affected by the new accidents, because a different substance would not be able to be so affected.

498. The proof of the third part [n.495], namely that it only returns immediately from God, is because no other agent has the active virtue sufficient for this.

499. A composite substance does not return, therefore, while the accidents of the Eucharist remain uncorrupt, as the first opinion says [n.452]; nor does the matter, as the second opinion says, return at the end by being repaired or by being created, because this would be altogether superfluous, since no action of a natural agent [nn.464-465] could be preserved in that form; nor does it return because, as the third opinion says [n.473], dimension is in some way susceptive of substantial form; nor is the possibility, the way the fourth opinion speaks [n.485], anything or convertible into anything.

500. But what change could come about while the Eucharist remains? It is plain that any alteration could that nothing is induced by incompossible with bread (were it to remain), and that any change in quantity could, either per se, as breaking or division (because the homogeneous parts of bread would be of nature to remain under the parts of divided quantity); or in quantity concomitantly, as in the case of rarefaction and densification, provided however a quantity is not induced that is repugnant to the substance of non-converted bread.

501. By contrast, however, corruptive change is to a quality to the degree in which the quality could not stand along with bread (if it were to remain), and this although the quantity remains altogether the same; such change, I say, cannot be brought about while the Eucharist remains, or at least is not in fact brought about. Hence, if it were possible for the heat of fire to be induced in the consecrated species to a degree repugnant to bread (were it present), and yet the quantity that was before remained altogether the same, the Eucharist would be corrupted; because the Eucharist does not consist in quantity alone but in other accidents necessarily consequent to converted substances; and consequently, in the inducing of the incompossible heat, the substance would in fact return, as was proved in the fourth conclusion [nn.495-496].

502. But it would not be necessary for substance to return because of the action of a natural agent, as the third conclusion says [n.493]; for a natural agent would have for subject the quantity into which the heat could be induced, as the proof of the third and fourth conclusion proves [nn.491-493]; and then a quantum hot with fiery heat would be there, and yet fire would not be there.

II. To the Initial Arguments

503. To the first argument [n.445] I say that a separate quantity does not have a positive mode of substance but only a negative one, namely this: ‘not actually being in a subject’. But this negative mode does not suffice for it to be more a subject than it was before; on the contrary, what it was able to be the immediate subject of before, that it can be the subject precisely of now as well. However, the argument that ‘quantity can be the subject of some change’ can be conceded, but not that quantity can be subject of change to substance, because required in that case is that the subject be the principle of a composite substance, as matter.

504. As to the second [n.446] I concede that a new miracle is not required for the action of a natural agent, as long as the agent has a passive object; but when it does not have a passive object, it cannot act unless a passive object is by a miracle given to it. But just as it cannot be given by nature, so the passive object required for generation is not here, nor can it be or be made to be from anything by a natural agent so as to be here. And so, in order for a natural agent to be able to act with this action, a passive object proportioned to it must return through a divine miracle. Nor yet do I say that when, according to the fourth conclusion [nn.495-498], it does return in fact, a natural agent generates something there, but that God alone first causes there a composite substance. But if a further generation of something ought to follow from that substance, then a natural agent can act there for substantial form, because it now has a passive object suited to it.

505. To the third argument [n.447] the answer is plain from the same fact, because a natural agent necessarily acts as much as it can act; but it cannot act there for anything able to be received in quantity, and therefore not for a substantial form; and therefore divine action is necessarily required.

506. And if you ask whether a natural agent acts so that the substance (returning by divine action) be a quantum with the quality that it induces in quantity, one could say that it does, because it acts naturally after God in bringing the substance back, and in that later moment it has a passive object receptive of the formal term for which it has the power, and consequently that passive object can be affected by the formal term.

507. Or the opposite could be said, namely that a natural agent does not so act [n.506], because a created agent can only in-form a substance with some accident if that substance had something repugnant before which is taken away by this sort of natural agent.

508. But this is not necessary, because if the contrary or the privation does not here precede in order of duration, the action of a natural agent is not for this reason taken away, because a natural agent can well have an effect coeval with itself; and have it in itself, as from the proper attribute that follows the subject, or have it in another, as that if sun and air were simultaneously created, the air would be simultaneously illumined by the sun, and yet no opposite of this light would have preceded in the air.

509. As to the fourth [n.448] Augustine says, significantly, “their own motions,” that is, motions in their proper power, and such is only what has a suitable subject; and a quantity for receiving substantial form is not of this sort; and therefore a new substance cannot be produced after mere quantity save immediately by divine action.